Abstract: In order to address the question whether Hayek might have been an Agent-based Computational Economist (ACE) avant-la-lettre, we consider an ACE model concerning the phenomenon of information contagion. Alongside increasing returns, network externalities, and information cascades, information contagion has been presented in the literature as an explanation for particular patterns of macrobehavior that may seem at odds with the underlying micromotives. But whereas these other explanations have been shown to have a proper microfoundation, information contagion has remained a phenomenon that seemed to occur only when certain ad hoc rules of thumb for individual behavior are assumed. We show how information-contagious behavior can emerge in a coevolutionary process of interacting adaptive agents, how this is related to various Hayekian themes, and how ACE research in general is an application of Hayek's methodological insights.
Introduction
Hayek was without doubt one of the great minds of economics, and not only of economics. Obviously, this paper will not pretend to question him being an ace. The Ace in the title rather refers to Agentbased Computational Economist (ACE). This is a recently established field of economics, forming a subfield of the equally contemporary field of computational economics. As Tesfatsion, one of the pioneers of the field, puts it on the ACE Web-site:
"Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is roughly characterized as the computational study of economies modelled as evolving decentralized systems of autonomous interacting agents. A central concern of ACE researchers is to understand the apparently spontaneous formation of global regularities in economic processes, such as the unplanned coordination of trade in decentralized market economies that economists associate with Adam Smith's invisible hand. The challenge is to explain how these global regularities arise from the bottom up, through the repeated local interactions of autonomous agents channeled through socio-economic institutions, rather than from fictitious top-down coordination mechanisms such as imposed market clearing constraints or an assumption of single representative agents. ACE is thus a specialization to economics of the basic complex adaptive systems (CAS) paradigm." (Tesfatsion [1998])
The descriptions used in this informal definition of ACE must look rather familiar to experts of Hayek.
Hayek shares with ACE the belief that the economy needs to be understood from a bottom-up perspective. In this he stands out from both Keynesian macroeconomics and Walrasian general equilibrium theory (e.g., Debreu [1959] ), which came to dominate the science of economics during Hayek's life. "Keynes' theories will appear merely as the most prominent and influential instance of a general approach to philosophical justification of which seems to be highly questionable. Though with its reliance on apparently measurable magnitude it appears at first more scientific than the older micro-theory, it seems to me that it has achieved this pseudo-exactness at the price of disregarding the relationships which really govern the economic system" (Hayek [1978] , p. 289). Hayek, on the other hand, insisted on the need to consider a market economy as a truly decentralized system of interacting individual agents: "( ) true individualism is the only theory which can claim to make the formation of spontaneous social products intelligible" (Hayek, [1948b] , p. 10), and Hayek seemed to share with Adam Smith the belief that an emergent, spontaneous order tends to be beneficial: "true individualism believes ( ) that, if left free, men will often achieve more than individual reason could design or foresee" (p. 11). Although the emergence of global regularities stands central on the ACE research agenda as well (see the Tesfatsion quote above), whether and when such spontaneous orders are beneficial is more an open research question in ACE.
Hayek's work was firmly rooted in the "antirationalistic" approach of the English individualism as known, for example, from Adam Smith's Invisible Hand metaphor (see, e.g., Hayek [1948b] (Mas-Colell et al. [1995] , p. 549).
1 But we have argued elsewhere (Vriend [1994] ), that general equilibrium models cannot be considered as ideal representations of decentralized economies because their main contribution has been to make Adam
Smith's transcendental hand visible by imposing various centralized concepts. These models base their analysis of a decentralized economy upon the actions of autonomous agents, pretending to discard any kind of external determination of the behavior of the individual agents. But it turns out that in order to explain anything, resort must be made to many concepts and structures that transcend the level of the individual agents. In particular, the existence of an auctioneer, the division of time into meta-and real time, and the rules of the game in these models are in no way the result of the behavior of the individual agents. Moreover, the set of possible actions of the individual agents is predetermined by the rules and structure of the model, and each individual takes the structure of the model into account in calculating his choices, anticipating the equilibrium character of the overall outcome, which should, instead, be explained by their actions. How can an individual agent in these models understand that the economy will turn out to be in equilibrium; unless he is God, the man with the invisible hand, or the auctioneer?
Given the easily recognizable connections between Hayek and ACE it is no surprise that many
Hayek experts seem interested in the recent complex systems literature. At the same time, however, most complexity and ACE researchers are hardly aware of Hayek's work at all. Every now and then somebody might mention that it would be interesting to have a closer look at Hayek's work, but that is about it. In this paper we will take up these suggestions. We present a concrete example of an ACE research project as a guide to address the question whether Hayek might have been an Agent-based
Computational Economist (ACE) avant-la-lettre in great detail. Apart from the purely intellectual motivation for such a study, some of the underlying questions motivating this project are: How could
Hayek's insights and theories help to understand ACE research? And what, if anything, could we learn from current ACE research about Hayek's work? Far from offering definite answers to these questions, this paper will suggest there might be some reasons to believe that a close encounter between Hayek and ACE has potential benefits that might work in both directions.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give a brief introductory sketch of the literature on complex adaptive systems. Section 3 presents our ACE model of the emergence of information contagion, and relates it to Hayek's work on the division of knowledge and information aggregation.
In section 4 we put our model into a somewhat wider perspective by discussing some related literature on information contagion and social learning. Section 5 presents an analysis of the properties of the model, while section 6 concludes with a discussion, in particular of some methodological issues.
Complex adaptive systems
As Tesfatsion explained, ACE is a specialization to economics of the basic complex adaptive systems paradigm. A 'complex system' is a system consisting of a large number of relatively independent parts that are interconnected and interactive. Such a system is 'adaptive', if these parts are agents that change their actions as a result of events occurring in the process of interaction. Some examples of complex systems are biological systems, immune systems, brains, the weather, ecologies, and societies. 2 A decentralized economy, consisting as it does of a large number of locally interconnected and interacting rational agents who are all continually pursuing advantageous opportunities, is also an example of a complex adaptive system. Persuasive arguments why this is the case can be found in Hayek [1948a] , written long before the term 'complex adaptive system' as such was known. 3 An essential characteristic of such systems is that their global properties cannot be derived simply from an examination of the individual components. Even when each individual agent is inherently simple, the behavior both of the system as a whole and the individual agents may become complex (see, e.g., Holland [1992] , Langton [1989] or Kauffman [1993] ).
A complex system is not the same as a chaotic system. In general, complex systems tend to evolve away from the extremes of, on one side, absolute order, and on the other side, what looks like complete randomness. Currently, the key theoretical concepts are self-organization (the formation of regularities in the patterns of interaction) and selection (through system constraints). Selection seems to act in many self-organizing systems to push the system continuously back to some 'boundary' between order and chaos. Around this 'edge', these systems appear to carry out the most complex behavior and adapt most readily to changing environments. We will illustrate precisely this property later in the paper, but here we just want to stress the importance of this feature (see also Hayek [1948] ).
As the interactions between the individual agents are in general nonlinear, from a mathematical point of view such systems are often intractable. And as far as economics is concerned, the available analytical apparatus borrowed from graph theory, statistical mechanics and the theory of interacting particle systems appears to be restrictive with respect to the economic contents of the models. It seems especially difficult to incorporate the essential fact that the interactions that take place between economic agents in reality, are not determined by their given position in a grid, graph or lattice, or by some kind of anonymous matching device. Most interactions in a decentralized economy are determined by economic agents who are themselves actively pursuing those interactions that are the most advantageous to them. Transactions do not take place in Walrasian central markets, or through anonymous random matching devices. Instead, market interactions depend in a crucial way on local 2 For an introduction to the topic of complexity in a broad sense, see Waldrop [1992] , Lewin [1993] , Casti [1994], and Gell-Mann [1994] .
3 These arguments did not influence many formal economic models, in which direct interaction between the agents is usually absent. See Kirman [1994] for a recent survey of economic models with interacting agents.
knowledge of the identity of some potential trading partners. A market in a decentralized economy, then, is not a central place where a certain good is exchanged, nor is it the aggregate supply and demand of a good. In general, markets emerge as the result of locally-interacting individual agents pursuing advantageous contacts, i.e., they are self-organized.
Given the limitations of formal analyses, one often has to rely on computational methods. One approach is to model each individual agent and their interactions explicitly; in other words, to provide these agents (real robots, or simulated machines) with artificial 'flesh and blood '. That 'bottom-up' approach is also known as the artificial life, or 'alife', approach (Langton [1989] ), and in economics nowadays as Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE). Modeling homo oeconomicus as a 'machine' does not seem to pose any particular conceptual difficulties to economic theory (see, e.g., Lane [1992] ). After all, as Lucas puts it, doing economics means "programming robot imitations of people" (in Klamer [1984] , p.49). Although Lucas' statement was only meant as a metaphor, current computational capabilities suggest taking it literally, and to consider its usefulness for economic theory.
What Lucas was referring to, of course, was that homo oeconomicus is a rather mechanical representation of real, live agents. The fundamental characteristic of homo oeconomicus is that he simply chooses (one of) the most preferred option(s) in his perceived opportunity set. In fact, homo oeconomicus is an 'opportunist'; always doing the best he can (see also Vriend [1996] ).
Making some simple assumptions concerning the preferences and technologies of the individual agents, this implies that the question of the modeling of the perceived opportunity sets of the individual agents becomes of central concern. During the process of interaction between the individual agents in a decentralized economy, perceived opportunities evolve; due either to a change in the underlying situation or to a change in the perception of this situation, i.e., learning. A general characteristic of agents living in the complexity of a 'large world' is that they do not have a true, wellspecified model to work with. That is, the agents' problem situation is ill-defined (see Arthur [1992] and [1994] ). Hence, instead of basing their actions on deductive reasoning from universal truths, they are forced to use inductive reasoning. Such reasoning proceeds from the actual situation faced by an agent. In Savage's [1954] terminology, this is the 'cross that bridge when you meet it' principle. In a large world individual agents are constantly searching, learning, and adapting to their environment.
In a decentralized economy, each individual's activities will in a certain way be 'involved' in the activities and decisions of some other agents. Hence, each agent will have a different relevant 'environment' for different kinds of activities, and these environments are influenced by the actions of other individual agents. In other words, while an individual agent is adapting to its environment, parts of the environment are adapting to him. In biology this phenomenon is known as coevolution.
In principle, such a process might go on forever (see, e.g., Sigmund [1995] ). Therefore, rather than analyzing whether an equilibrium exists for an economy with some given structure, in ACE one analyzes how structures and patterns emerge as regularities in the process of interaction of the individual agents. In other words, instead of 19th-century physics, it is biology or meteorology that provides the relevant metaphors for this approach to the study of decentralized economies. 
The Agent-based Computational model
The basic choice problem we consider is that of a population of individual agents who each face a decision problem between two items with uncertain qualities. We can think of these two items as new products, technologies, services, financial gurus, or whatever binary choice agents might need to make frequently in every day life. The rationale to focus on the introduction of new items is explained by Hayek [1948e] The only information the agents have is the choice plus the corresponding value experienced by a sample of other agents who had faced the same decision problem before them. This basic choice problem has been considered in the literature on information contagion, and in some literature on social learning. We will discuss some of this literature in section 4. Information contagion occurs when the probability that an individual agent chooses a certain option is a positive monotonic function of the number of agents who had made that choice already (independent from the actual values experienced by them). For any form of social learning to which this applies, this implies a diffusion process such that a certain choice once it starts being made by a certain number of people spreads quickly in a population. One basically unanswered question is, where such information contagious behavior comes from.
The basic problem situation
There is a population of 250 decision makers. In a given period they face a choice between two items that were previously unknown to them. Each new item i is characterized by the expected value of the utility it will generate, EV i . These expected values are unknown to the individual agents. Given an expected value, EV i , the value that a specific agent will actually experience from an item will be a random draw from a uniform distribution with support from EV i -0.25 to EV i +0.25. Hence, if a given item i is characterized by an EV of, say, 0.40, the actual utility levels experienced by the individual agents choosing this item will range from 0.15 to 0.65, with every utility level in this range equally likely to occur. Notice that we do not have any increasing real returns to scale of any form, no change in taste, endogenously determined utility depending on the number of adopters, nor are there complementarities or network externalities. Each individual agent's utility of a certain item is simply a random draw from the same uniform distribution characterized by the item's expected value EV. These 'men on the spot', then, face their choice problem sequentially, with the order of the agents being random. Although each individual agent himself has no experience with these two specific new items, he can draw six random samples from the people that have made already a decision before him.
For each of the elements in his sample, he can observe the choice made, and the value actually experienced by the agent. Given this sample information, an agent makes a choice himself, and then the next agent in the queue makes his decision, until the end of the queue is reached. Before the first agent in the sequence makes his decision in a given period, we add six dummy agents. Three of these dummies choose one item, and the other three the other item. This 50-50 seeding prevents any bias at the start of a period. The reason to do this is that lock-in due to the choice of these very first dummy agents would be an uninteresting artifact. 4 Ellison & Fudenberg [1993] give some agricultural examples which illustrate this point. 5 Notice that we take the number of observations sampled as given. However, as Streit & Wegner [1989] point out, there is a fundamental paradox here, one that we avoid. The value of information is unknown until you have got it. Agents can learn something without knowing whether this information constitutes a net gain. Hence, equalizing marginal costs and marginal revenue is impossible. In fact, there is a dual decision problem. First, to collect information and second, to make choices.
We can think of the sampling by the individual agents as a further reflection of the fact that information as to the utility of a specific item is largely local. Ellison & Fudenberg [1993] present some evidence suggesting "( ) that farmers often distrust the information of central authorities and experts, and prefer to see how innovations work out in their neighborhood" (p. 631). Therefore, each agent only samples in his own 'neighborhood', where a 'neighborhood' is not necessarily spatial but the subset of agents with whom he has contact, and that he believes to be relevant for the issue concerned. Although the random payoffs generated by a given item reflect Hayek's observations that "every individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made" (Hayek [1948e] , p. 80) of the item, and that "(a)t any given moment the equipment of a particular firm is always largely determined by historical accident, and the problem is that it should make the best use of the given equipment ( )" (Hayek [1948f] (Hayek [1948f] , p. 94).
In any case, as figure 1 illustrates, in general the information sampled will be far from conclusive to determine which of the two items has the greatest expected value. For example, a utility level of 0.6 experienced by a specific agent in a sample could have been generated by an item with an expected value of 0.35, but also by an item with an expected value of 0.85. Obviously, this uncertainty matters a great deal for an agent that needs to make such a decision. We assume that each agent has in mind a set of simple rules of thumb to choose an item, and that the propensity to use any of these rules may change over time as a result of an agent's experience in the use of these rules. Therefore, before we explain in detail the modeling of the decision making and learning by the individual agents, we need to clarify how the individual agents face a similar basic choice problem over and over again.
Choice dynamics
All individual agents face the same basic choice problem for 25,000 periods. In every period two new items arrive, and all agents sequentially face a choice between them, with the order of the agents being determined at random in every single period. The fact that we modeled the sampling in a given period as random is a short-cut to take into account that for every day-to-day decision an individual agent may have a different relevant 'neighborhood', and we do not want to impose any given, fixed structure on these neighborhoods.
As we explained in section 3.1, every item appearing is characterized by its expected value. This expected value itself, which is unknown to the agents, is also a random draw from a uniform distribution; this time with support from 0.25 to 0.75. Hence, the worst item that can ever appear has an expected value of 0.25 (generating values for individual agents between 0.0 and 0.5), and the best possible item has an expected value of 0.75 (yielding utility levels between 0.5 and 1.0). Obviously, the ranges of utility levels that can be generated by intermediate items overlap with each other, as shown in figure 1. Every 500th period, the expected values of the two items are identical (0.5). This identical expected value case serves as a useful benchmark to see how much information contagion and path-dependency has emerged. While we use this benchmark every 500th period, in all other periods the expected value of the two items will not be identical, with one of the two items being superior in a statistical sense.
Although we have not said much about individual decision making and learning yet, intuition might suggest that this must be a trivial problem. If we run the model for 25,000 periods, and if in every period (apart from the benchmark periods) one of the two items is superior, then, surely, eventually every agent will easily discover which item is better. However, matters are slightly more complicated.
Every period, two new, unknown items appear, and each item is up for choice only once during the entire history. Hence, the learning concerns the general rules of behavior, and not the specific, particular items as such. The fact that the agents learn the usefulness of general rules of behavior, and not the value of specific items also implies that if an agent oversees a certain sample of prior adoptions by other agents he might choose item 1, whereas he might have chosen 2 if he were confronted with the same two items but a different sample of prior adoptions.
Individual decision making and learning
The individual agent's decision making is modeled for each individual agent separately by means of a Classifier System. active, and has generated a reward from the environment in a given period t-1, as follows: s t = s t-1 -c s t-1 + c reward t-1 , where 0<c<1. Hence, ∆s t = c (reward t-1 -s t-1 ). In other words, as long as the reward generated by the rule in period t-1 is greater than its strength at t-1, its strength will increase.
As a result, the strength of each rule converges to the weighted average of the rewards from the environment generated by that rule. 6 In our implementation of this model, the strengths of all rules are equal at the start.
Classifier Systems are a form of reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning is related to multiarmed bandit problems, and is based on two principles. First, agents try actions. Second, actions that led to better outcomes in the past are more likely to be repeated in the future. There is a family of stochastic dynamic models of such individual behavior in the scientific literature, for which different backgrounds can be distinguished. The idea was first developed in the psychological literature. See especially Hull [1943] , and Bush & Mosteller [1955] , on which Cross [1983] is based. Much later, reinforcement learning was independently reinvented twice as a machine learning approach in computer science. See, e.g., Barto et al. [1983] , and Sutton [1992] for a survey of an approach called reinforcement learning. The other reinforcement learning approach in computer science is known as Classifier Systems. See Holland [1975] for early ideas on this, or Holland et al. [1986] for a more elaborate treatment of the issue of induction in general. In the economics literature reinforcement learning became better known only recently through Roth & Erev [1995] .
Interestingly, Hayek [1973] seems to have anticipated much of the insights of this literature, and in particular his ideas seem very close to those presented in Holland et al. [1986] . Savage's [1954] terminology, the adaptive behavior implied by this bounded rationality is known as following the 'cross that bridge when you meet it' principle, which is necessary when an agent is in a 'large world', as opposed to the 'small world' to which Subjective Expected Utility theory applies. In a large world, the agent's situation is ill-defined in the sense that he does not have a well-specified model of his environment. Hence, instead of deducing optimal actions from universal truths, he will need to employ inductive reasoning, i.e., proceeding from the actual situation he faces. As Hayek [1973] It should be stressed that the CSs are not models of agents using only simple decision rules.
Although each rule for itself in a CS is a simple rule, it is the set of rules that forms the link between actions and previous actions and outcomes, and it is not the individual rules that matter. As is wellknown, such a representation of knowledge is not restrictive in any sense, and any program that can be written in a standard programming language can be implemented in a CS. That is, these systems are 'computationally complete' (see Minsky [1967] All these concepts (the use of simple rules of thumb, and in particular 'if ... then ...' rules, the evolution of the rules used, which is based on the experience with the use of these rules, in particular their degree of success, and the role of abstraction and schemata) are worked out in great detail in Holland et al. [1986] But obviously, the social element has not disappeared completely. Which rules are good depends on which rules other people follow as well. Hence, evolution also takes place at a social level. This is called coevolution: one individual's set of rules evolve in response to the rules used by other individuals, with the sets of all these individuals evolving at the same time. Table 1 summarizes the set of rules we actually used in our model. Obviously, rules 1 to 12 are only eligible if both items appear in the sample (the same applies to rules 21 to 32). Rules 10 to 12 measure both the average and the variation of the values in a sample. To illustrate that these rules of thumb compete with each other, and that given the six sample observations, different rules of thumb may lead to different product choices, consider the following example. If the choices in an agent's sample are three times item 1, and three times item 2, with utility levels of 0.48, 0. 71, and 0.28 for item 1, and 0.41, 0.37, and 0.44 for item 2, then rule 1 (choose highest average) would point to item 1, while rule 4 (choose highest minimum) would lead to item 2. The relative importance of each rule of thumb in a decision makers decision process depends on the payoffs generated by these rules of thumb, such that rules that gave riser to higher payoffs are more likely to be used. As explained above, the agents continuously update their beliefs in this respect. 8 Besides through the white noise added to the 'bids' of the Classifier System (see above), the agents experiment through some kind of 'trembling hand', mistakenly picking the item they did not intend to with a given small probability.
Some related literature on information contagion and social learning
Alongside increasing returns (Arthur [1989] ), network externalities (Katz & Shapiro [1985] and [1986] ), information cascades (Bikhchandani et al. [1992) , and herding behavior (Banerjee [1992] ), information contagion (Arthur & Lane [1991] ) has been presented in the literature as an explanation for particular patterns of macrobehavior (for example, path-dependency and lock-in effects) that may seem at odds with the underlying micromotives. But whereas these other explanations have been
shown to have a proper microfoundation (either related to changing productivity or changing preferences, or to Bayesian updating in the face of uncertainty), information contagion has remained a phenomenon that occurs only when certain ad hoc rules of thumb for individual behavior are assumed.
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Making use of the theory of generalized Polya urn schemes (see Hill et al. [1980] ), Arthur & Lane [1991] show that in a population of naive Bayesian optimizers information contagion tends to drive the market to stable (but not complete) domination by a single product. This is caused by the fact that the more a product has been chosen already by others, the more likely it is to be in an individual agent's sample on which he has to base his choice, and hence the more precise his information concerning the true quality of the product. Dosi et al. [1994] show similar results for a given rule of thumb that is more directly imitative. Narduzzo & Warglien [1996] carried out two experiments to test the empirical importance of information contagion. Between 50 and 170 experimental subjects were instructed that they faced the choice between two products of which the objective value is uncertain, while the same product can generate a different value for different subjects. The players made their choice sequentially, and each player received information concerning the choice and value generated of a random sample of six subjects that had already made their choice at that point. In fact, the values generated by the two products had the same uniform distribution on [0.25, 0.75] and in another treatment these values were drawn for both products from [0.60, 1.00]. They observed that path-dependent dynamics emerged and that lock-in of market shares occurred, with early accidental choices giving rise to a seemingly stable cumulative market shares with the prevalence of one product over the other. They, then, tried to find out which choice heuristics the players used. Therefore, they interviewed some players after the experiment and they did some 'thinking-aloud' protocol analysis. They found four basic choice heuristics: the mean rule (highest average), the min rule (highest minimum), the max rule (highest maximum), and the popularity rule (follow majority). They observe that these rules are not necessarily used in isolation, and that subjects may have changed their rule on the basis of their experience from one run to another. Also, there might be context-sensitivity, with different samples inducing the use of different rules. Lane & Vescovini [1996] analyzed the aggregation effects of these four rules, with the assumption that all subjects follow the same rule. They find that the mean and the min rule never produce pathdependent behavior. The popularity rule always generates path-dependent market shares, and the max rule only when the products are exactly identical. Hence, three of the four rules reported by the subjects do not generate path-dependence. So the question is, where did the observed path-dependence come from? Lane & Vescovini note that the emergence of path-dependence and information contagion is related to the mix of rules actually used in the population, and that an important question is how people change rules after they experience outcomes. Since learning is a coevolutionary process (while one agent is learning all other agents are learning simultaneously), these two points should be population that leads to path-dependence come from? Is it based on arbitrary, extremely boundedly rational behavior? Or is it reasonable to learn rules of behavior that give rise to information contagion? Ellison & Fudenberg [1993] consider a closely related problem of the use of rules of thumb in a situation where agents need to choose between two items with unknown value, and where social learning takes place. They assume that players use exogenously specified, simple rules of thumb. One justification they give for this is that they do not consider fully Bayesian learning a realistic assumption, because it requires calculations that may be too complicated. In each period some fraction of the players have the opportunity to revise their choices. They only observe last period's payoffs and choices of all agents. They present some simple and some more complicated rules which are all some form of a popularity weighted choice of the highest average, and they derive the optimal weight of the popularity for some of these rules. However, since they assume rules of thumb that are exogenously given, a relevant question is whether it is likely that these optimal weights will actually be used. In support of a positive answer Ellison & Fudenberg note that they showed in a working paper that all agents using the optimal weights constitutes an equilibrium, but they stress that important extensions of their analysis are needed. The reason for this is that the precise specification of these rules supposes more sophistication of the agents than they find themselves compelling. Therefore, conjecturing that the optimal popularity weighing might emerge from an adaptive process, dynamics, but we can also do an explicit analysis of the rules of thumb actually used.
The basic choice situation in our ACE model as described in section 3.1 follows closely the one used in the information contagion papers discussed in this section. The two main differences are the following. In the information contagion experiments by Narduzzo & Warglien [1996] , the expected values of the two items are actually identical, although this was not known to the subjects. In our ACE model the two expected values are generally different in every period (apart from the benchmark periods). The reason to use these different expected values in all periods not being a multiple of 500 is that if the two products would have an identical performance distribution in every period, then there would no relation between the rules of thumb used and the payoffs generated. That is, since on average any of the two items is equally good, any rule of thumb is as good as any other rule, and hence there would be no selection pressure at all. Therefore, in our model in each cycle of 500 periods we have 499 periods in which the average performance of the two products is different, in order to
give selection some bite, and then we check in the 500th period what the selection process has achieved by using the two products with identical performance as a benchmark case.
In Ellison & Fudenberg [1993] there are only two items, and the agents can revise their choice between these two specific items in every period. As explained above, in our model, agents face the choice between two specific items only once. Obviously, this could be easily modified by allowing agents to revise their choice once they have experienced it themselves (as in Ellison & Fudenberg [1993] ). However, the fundamental problem, then, is still the same. On the basis of a small sample of observations the agents need to make a choice between two items. The way they do this is using some rule of thumb. Hence, the choice of rules of thumb will still be an essential issue, and a dynamic model with adaptive agents remains a promising approach to understand this. 
Analysis of the model
In order to analyze the properties of our ACE model, we run the model sketched in section 3 with 100 agents for 25,000 periods. 10 Notice that the dynamics that Ellison & Fudenberg [1993] study concerns the choice of technology from period to period, and not the dynamics of the rules of thumb to choose technologies from period to period.
cannot be deduced merely from the objective facts, since the analysis of what people will do can start only from what is known to them" (p. 44). This leads to "( ) the general question of why the subjective data to the different persons correspond to the objective facts. Our problem of knowledge here is just the existence of this correspondence ( )" (p. 51/52).
Although knowledge is very much divided in our model, each agent has a sample of six observations, and these samples of the individual agents overlap. Related to this, Hayek [1948e] conjectures that "( ) the whole acts as one market ( ) because their limited fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all" (p. 86).
Hence, some more specific questions we want to answer are the following. Do the agents through their spontaneous interaction learn to use rules of thumb that solves the division of knowledge problem?
How do the market outcomes look like? And do we get path-dependence and lock-in effects?
Path-dependency and lock-in
We first focus on the benchmark periods in which the expected value of both items is 0.50, i.e., the periods that are a multiple of 500. We want to know how the market shares of the two items develop as we go down the sequence of 100 agents in a given period, and in particular we want know how this development changes over time as the agents learn which rules of thumb to use. Figure 3 shows some examples of a typical run: the development of the market share of one of the items in periods 1000, 10,000, and 23,000. 11 We did various runs, but for presentational reasons most results here are given for one representative run only. One of the reasons being that any single run shows some typical fluctuations that are largely canceled out by averaging over various runs. Each sequence starts with a market share of 0.50 because of the initial choices by the six dummies. The market share of the other item is just one minus the share of the item shown, that is, the curve shown mirrored in the straight line at 0.50.
If there were no information externalities or contagion at all, every choice would be an independent decision, with each of the two items being equally likely to be chosen (as in these benchmark periods the two items were equally good), and the development of the market shares would be basically a random walk, zigzagging around a 0.50 market share. As we see in figure 3 , this is what happens in period 1000, when the agents have had only little opportunity to learn, and they basically behave like 'zero intelligence' agents (see Gode & Sunder [1993] ). If we showed this curve in period 1000 for different runs, or other benchmark periods towards the beginning of a run, we would get a series of different zigzag curves that stay all close to the 0.50 market share line. 12 The market share curve shown for period 10,000 looks very different. Just as in period 1000, we see some deviations from a 0.50 share early on, but unlike in period 1000, this time we see that the item that gets a smaller market share early on continues to lose ground for some time. Eventually, its share stabilizes at a level just below 30%. The rather smooth curve for period 23,000 shows the positive feedback effect even much stronger. We see one item right from the start increasing its market share continually until it dominates the market almost completely. Although the two items are identical in this period, the information contagion (as the agents happen to learn such behavior, as we will show below) leads to lock-in.
Which of the two item gets to dominate is basically random, due to small historical events. That is, it is path-dependent. Figure 4 looks at the same phenomenon, the setting in of information contagion, focusing on the individual choices of all 100 agents. In figure 4 .a we see an almost random sequence of choices in period 1000, shifting from one item to the other item all the time, and there is very little order, if any.
In figure 4 .b, showing the same for period 10,000, and in figure 4.c for period 23,000, we see an increasingly orderly pattern. In figure 4 .c, although the two items are identical, item 2 does not seem very fashionable, with agent after agent choosing the item 1, and only some occasional deviations from the norm.
13
12 The fact that the zigzags appear to become smoother towards the end of the sequence is due to the fact that each additional decision maker carries less weight in the cumulative market share as we move down the line of 100 agents.
13 If the fashion changed from one item to the other every now and then, this would show up as waves in figure 4.
As figures 3 and 4 show, the decentralized interaction of the individual agents leads to a situation in which almost all agents choosing the same item emerged as a spontaneous order, where "(b)y 'order' we ( ) describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct" (Hayek [1973] , p. 36).
The behavior of a complex system is often said to be characterized by a '2+2=5 effect', the system being more than the sum of its parts (see, e.g., Parker & Stacey [1994] ). It might be that this term comes from the description of the behavior of simple non-linear dynamic functions, where the chaotic outcomes, going 'all over the place', seem profuse given the simple input specification. However, the striking feature of self-organized systems, as stressed by Hayek [1973] , is not their chaos (that anything can happen), but quite on the contrary their order (that something very precise happens). It might also be that the '2+2=5' label stems from the observation that it is not possible to understand the behavior of a complex system by examining only its separate components. While this is correct, when it comes to self-organization the issue seems not so much that a complex system is more than the sum of its parts, but that it is less than the sum of its parts, with the difficulty arising because one cannot predict which of the possibilities will be realized by examining only the constituent parts.
Hence, when it comes to describing the self-organizing aspect of a complex adaptive system, the emerging spontaneous order, it seems more useful to call it a '2+2=3 effect'. 14 The market share curves and the individual choice curves shown suggest a simple story. As time goes on, the more information contagion develops, and the more the population gets self-organized, the more the development of market shares gets a particular pattern, with rather smooth curves concentrated in a relatively small space with either a very high or a very low market share. However, as we will show in a moment, matters are slightly more complicated. The spontaneous order emerging turns out to be far from absolute. In every run it takes some time before the information contagion starts giving rise to lock-in and path-dependency effects, but once the population gets self-organized this turns out to be not a monotonic process at all. Giving the period 10,000 or 23,000 curves for different runs, or giving these curves for different benchmark periods from the same run, would show market share curves going all over the place. Sometimes one item almost completely dominates the market, other times we see the fashion switching at some point from one item to the other, and sometimes this switching occurs so frequently that we get a zigzag curve similar to the one shown for period 1000. Hence, the curves seem to drift about in all directions, and the system moves all the time between almost complete order and almost complete disorder, but never stays at either of these. We will explain this phenomenon in section 5.2, but first we will illustrate this a little bit more by using different measures for what goes on in the market.
Obviously, the final market share of an item is not exhaustively informative concerning the amount of lock-in generated. One change in fashion at the middle of the sequence would be sufficient to end up with 50-50 shares. Therefore, we take as a measure the average absolute distance between the cumulative market share curve (as shown in figure 3 ) and the straight line at 0.50, divided by 0.50.
Basically, we take the relative size of the area between the market share curve and the straight line at 0.50, relative to the size of the rectangle defined by the axes and the 0.50 line as a measure of the path-dependence in the population's decisions. The more systematically the market stays away from a 50-50 distribution, the more lock-in we have. This measure, the lock-in rate, is a number between 0 and 1, and is shown in figure 5 for all benchmark periods, i.e., those that are a multiple of 500. As we see, lock-in ranges from low values around 0.1 at the beginning, and tends to get higher values as time goes on, up to about 0.80, but there remains a lot of variation all the time, with lock-in regularly falling back to the low initial values. Another way to measure how much lock-in into one of the two items is present is the rate at which the choices of the agents switch from one to the other item in the benchmark periods. If each individual decision is taken independently, and the items are equally good, the expected switch rate is 0.50. Figure 6 shows the switch rates for each of the benchmark periods. As we see, the switch rate starts indeed around 0.50, and then comes down as time proceeds, but just as with the lock-in rates above, this goes with a lot of fluctuations. The switch rate regularly comes down to values close to 0, implying a very orderly state in which every agent chooses the same item, but almost equally regularly the switch rate jumps back to levels close to 0.50, the maximum disorder, as if all agents choose randomly. 
Performance over time
In the benchmark periods analyzed in section 5.1, the two items were always identical. In those periods, any item was as good as the other item, and hence any decision rule was as good as any other decision rule. We used those periods to see how much information contagious behavior the agents had acquired during the periods in between the benchmark periods, periods in which the two items were generally not identical. Before we analyze the behavior of the individual agents, we first want to see what the effects of the learning of the agents is on the overall outcomes for the society. Figure 7.a shows the 100-period moving average of the relative frequency with which the best of the two items is picked in each of the first 5000 periods, and figure 7.b does the same for the periods 20,100 to 25,000. The relative frequency with which the superior item is chosen, i.e., the final cumulative market share of the superior item in a given period, is a good measure of social efficiency.
At the start, with people making almost random choices, about 50% of the agents pick the correct item. This average frequency increases over time, and in figure 7.b it has reached a level of about 86%, without much further increase suggested by the trend.
The increase in performance as such takes place in part because the agents start using better rules, but in part this is also because they start aggregating information. We will analyze this in more detail below. That we do not reach higher efficiency levels is related to the fact that often the two items have an expected performance that is extremely close. In fact, on average the expected performance for the worst item turns out to be 0.42, and for the best item 0.58. Hence, in many periods the difference in expected performance is close to zero. Instead of the 100-period moving average of the performance, figure 8 shows every single period, and reveals that underlying these moving average performances something interesting is happening. Notice that every 500 periods the items are equally good, and hence everybody makes the right choice. More interesting is the observation that while the (moving) average performance goes up, the spread increases as well. In the beginning, in every period about 50% of the agents choose the correct item.
Sometimes this is a little bit lower, and sometimes a little bit higher, but never very much so. For some time performances never exceed the 35 to 70% band. But as times goes on, and average performance goes up, occasionally periods occur in which only 30% of the agents pick the superior item. Later on there are periods with just 15% choosing correctly, and eventually (after about 5000 periods) it sometimes even happens that almost nobody recognizes which is the best item. All the time, though, the moving average of the performance shows an upward trend. As noticed above, in part the spread in performance is due to the fact that on average the expected performances of the two items is rather close, occasionally leading many people to the wrong choice. But the frequency with which the expected performances are close to each other (making mistakes likely) does not change over time.
Hence, the change in spread over time that we observe is due to the adaptive behavior of the agents.
As they learn, they improve their average performance, but occasionally this leads to disasters, with almost everybody choosing the wrong item.
As mentioned above, there are basically two things going on during the history presented. First, the agents learn to use better rules as such, i.e., the rules that lead to higher utility levels because they are better at recognizing which is the superior item on the basis of six sample observations. The dynamics are in part the result of this evolution of the rules being used. Second, as a given agent learns which rules to use, this influences his choices, which has two effects. First, it gives the choosing agent a certain utility. But at the same time, there is also an externality, as the choice of the given agent is added to the information pool on which the choices of future agents will be based. Hence, there is interaction between the agents' choices. As one agent learns and changes his behavior, other agents are learning as well, partly in response to this. This is a coevolutionary process; the rules that an agent uses evolving in response to the evolution of other agents' rules. Why is this information externality relevant? That is, why would an agent want to adapt his rules in response to what other agents do?
This is because of the phenomenon of information aggregation. On the one hand, as Arthur & Lane [1991] argued, an increase in the number of observations concerning a certain item leads to more reliable estimates of its value, and hence makes the item more attractive for risk-averse agents. On the other hand, there is even more direct information aggregation. Suppose every agent bases his choice on the six observations he has sampled, i.e., on the choice of item and the payoffs actually generated for those six agents. Now, consider a rule that tells an agent to follow the choice of the majority in his sample. This rule does not consider the actual payoffs generated by the six agents in the sample.
But if each of the six agents in the sample had considered the payoffs in their samples of six, then the 'follow the majority' rule implicitly considers six times six or 36 sample payoffs instead of only six.
That is, the rule aggregates the information of the agents in the sample.
To analyze the effects of these two factors that explain the increase in the average performance (i.e., the learning as such, and the information externality) we did the following experiment, which excludes the information externality. The basic choice situation in this variant of the model is the same as above. But this time every agent, when making his choice, does not observe what other agents did before him, nor the payoffs they realized. Instead, when an agent's turn comes, he can six times randomly choose an item himself, and observe the payoffs generated. 15 Hence, the only difference with the standard model is that there is no interaction between the agents, hence no information externality, and thus no possibility of information aggregation. Figure 9 shows the cumulative market shares for the periods 5000, 10,000, 15,000, 20,000, and 25,000.
As we see, there is no lock-in or path-dependency, which also applies to all benchmark periods not shown. The cumulative market share always stays around 0.50. This was to be expected, because these were all benchmark periods in which the two items are identical, and all agents make their choice independently. Since there is no information externality, we get no path-dependence, and hence no lock-in. Although there is no information externality here, of course, the agents still learn which rules are more likely to pick the superior item on the basis of a sample of six observations. Figure 10 .a shows the 100-period moving average of the relative frequency with which the best of the two items is picked in each of the first 5000 given periods, and figure 10.b does the same for the periods 20,100 to 25,000.
We observe that the performance, starting from a level of 0.50 which even random choice would achieve, increase to a level of about 0.77. That is, the agents do learn to improve their performance by using the better rules, but they stay below the average performance in the standard version, when it reached a level of about 0.86. In other words, taking advantage of the information externality by aggregating knowledge, the agents succeed in winning another 10% in performance in the standard version. Figure 11 shows every single period of the graphs underlying figure 10. As we see, the performance tends to rise, but, apart from the benchmark periods, it almost never gets close to 1, and there are also no disasters. In the most unfortunate periods, still about 40% of the agents succeed in choosing the superior item. This illustrates at the same time the advantage and the limits of the information aggregation. By aggregation the agents succeed in reaching very high performance levels in many periods, higher than they could ever achieve on their own. But when agents aggregate information (e.g., following the majority rule), an agents wastes some information as well, since he does not use the information concerning the actual payoffs realized by the six people in his sample.
As we explained above, if a single agent aggregates information he implicitly uses six times six, i.e., 36, observations instead of only the six in his own sample. But if each of the six agents in his sample would also be aggregating information, they would each implicitly use 36 observations, and hence our single agent would be using six times 36, i.e., 218, observations. Hence, the more agents use aggregating rules, the more aggregation of knowledge occurs. But when too many agents aggregate information, too many agents waste their own information. At some point a tiny little bit of knowledge starts getting aggregated ad absurdum. In some sense, the agents start aggregating ignorance instead of knowledge.
The individual decision rules
One of the advantages of an ACE approach is that we, as modelers, know for each single period which of the two items is superior. Hence, for each single decision to be made by any of the agents, given his sample of six observations, we can check for each of the 39 rules whether it would have picked the superior item. Obviously, the individual agents do not obtain this information. They only try one rule of behavior in every period, and observe the payoffs they generate doing so. Figure 12 shows the time series of the relative frequencies that a given rule would have picked the superior item. 17 In fact, this graph shows the relative frequency that a given rule belongs to an agent's bestreply correspondence. As we see, picking an item at random (rule 'random') leads to the superior item in about 50% of the cases, and this remains constant over time. Looking at just one other agent, and imitating whatever he picked (rule 'last') starts close to 50%, but as other agents learn to make better choices, the performance of this rule increases considerably, and gets close to the rules that choose the highest maximum in the sample (rule 'average'), or the highest maximum compensated for the variance (rule '"Bayesian"'). This increase in performance applies even much more to the rule that says to follow the majority of the six observations sampled (rule 'majority'). This rule, which does not use any of the available information concerning the utility levels obtained by the six agents sampled, at some point starts beating all other rules.
18 Two other rules stand out. The rule that chooses the highest minimum (rule 'minimum') deteriorates over time. The explanation for this is that, implicitly, it does the opposite of information aggregation. It favors the item that is the least chosen, because the more an item is chosen the more likely it is that some observation will be in the lower part of the distribution, and hence be the lowest minimum in the sample. Exactly the opposite applies to the rule that chooses the highest maximum (rule 'maximum'). The more an item is chosen, the more likely it is it will provide the highest maximum in the sample.
The important thing to notice here is that the degree to which a given rule is objectively good changes over time as a result of the other agents are changing the rules they use. To show how the effect of the information externality makes it a coevolutionary process, i.e., the agents adapting to each others' adaptation to each other ..., figure 13 presents the frequencies with which the individual rules form part of an agent's best-response correspondence in the variant in which there are no information externalities. As we see, these frequencies remain constant over time, apart from some random noise.
The only thing the agents need to learn is to figure out which of these rules are most often good in a given situation. Obviously, for different situations different rules might be best. But which rule is good for a given sample configuration does not change over time. This is very much unlike figure To conclude our analysis of the model, could it be that the famous QWERTY lock-in has less to do with network externalities and other real payoff matters than with information contagion? After all, with the current technology, and most people using a personal computer, switching a keyboard layout is relatively easy. It is true that it requires a little bit of personal investment (time and effort to change the layout itself, plus some re-training), but if individual agents knew an alternative keyboard were superior, that would be no obstacle. The only problem seems that individual agents do not know whether it worth choosing an alternative keyboard layout, and generating own sample observations by trying various different keyboard layouts is rather costly. Hence, an individual agent needs to base his decision on the choices made by other people, and as our ACE model demonstrates, it might be that it is the emergence of information contagious behavior that leads to a QWERTY lock-in.
Discussion
Hayek greatly contributed to keeping the tradition alive, and extending it considerably, of studying the economy as a self-organizing system (a tradition going back at least to Adam Smith), against the dominating influence of both the Walrasian general equilibrium theory and the Keynesian macroeconomics. In doing so, he presented us with important research questions, some of which have been taken up in this study in which individuals have to make repeatedly a choice between two previously unknown items while they can rely only on some information from previous adopters.
One of the particular contributions of Hayek is his view, first, that through a self-organizing process the economy will overcome the problem of the division of knowledge, and second, that in aggregating information this will lead to the socially desirable outcomes. Our ACE model basically confirms Hayek's vision, but one of the benefits from this ACE approach is that we see that matters are slightly more complicated than perhaps expected by Hayek.
First, our ACE model exhibited self-organization, and the emergence of spontaneous orders, in which typically most agents choose the same, superior item, and indeed we observed that "such an order will utilize the separate knowledge of all its several members, without this knowledge ever being concentrated in a singe mind ( )" (Hayek [1973] , p. 41). But it turned out that this was not a simple monotonic process from disorder to order until the solution had been reached, with a happy ending.
Instead, the system was continually moving back and forth between order and disorder. That is, the self-organization is a continuing, ongoing story, in which the emerging order unravels time and again. Second, the emerging spontaneous order was beneficial. That is, on average. But along with the improved average performance we also saw an increase in both the number and degree of disasters.
We explained how there is a tension between generating knowledge and aggregating knowledge. If enough knowledge is generated by the individual agents, aggregation leads to good outcomes, but if everybody would merely aggregate over and over again a tiny little bit of knowledge, this might lead occasionally to very bad outcomes for the society. In fact, it is this which keeps the self-organizing process from being a monotonic one. If it were monotonic, we would get stuck with only disasters.
Hence, we can address Hayek's [1948c optimistic conjecture that the overlap of the knowledge of the individual agents will aggregate the divided knowledge in such a way that the objectively optimal solution will emerge. As our ACE model shows, pointing to occasional disasters (QWERTY?, VHS?) is not sufficient to reject this hypothesis, as the average performance did improve considerably. This was the result of the emergence of information contagious behavior of the individual agents. Information contagion is a way to aggregate distributed knowledge in society, allowing the individuals and the society to achieve higher performance levels. This came together with path-dependent lock-in effects, but in some sense, the remarkable thing is not so much the emergence of these effects, but the fact that this was related to a high performance.
Although Hayek did not have the ACE tools available, 20 he had not only a view of the economy as a complex system, but his explanation for the emergence of beneficial spontaneous orders also relied on a view of the role of the individual agents that seems very much congruent with the one used in the ACE approach, which focuses on bounded rationality and rule-based behavior. For one reason or another almost every paper in economics that uses the concept of bounded rationality refers to
Simon (see e.g., Simon [1955] , [1957] , [1959] or [1976] ). But Hayek [1948b] asserts that viewing human agents as inherently boundedly rational has a much longer tradition. Moreover, Hayek's view of the importance of inductive behavior, with the emergence of simple rules of behavior on the basis of the outcomes experienced in the use of such rules, fits almost perfectly with much more recent approaches in computer science and ACE (see, in particular, Holland et al. [1986] ). And although
Hayek used a group selection argument, which is largely out of favor nowadays, our ACE example illustrates that the basic idea of Hayek can be retained, with selection operating on a set of ideas instead of groups. In our ACE analysis the beneficial information aggregation, and more in particular the best rule being the one to follow the majority, did not emerge because of an evolutionary process working through group selection, nor did it come through a selection of individuals. It arose through a coevolutionary process, the simultaneous evolution of rules of behavior used by the individual agents.
And apart from envisaging the tools used in recent ACE research, Hayek also correctly foresaw that it is not the use of simple rules of thumb as such that matters, but also the fact that this usage is based all the time on the experience of the outcomes thus generated. Only the current state-of-the-art allows us to model these matters precisely. Old fashioned simulations based on fixed rules of thumb as done in the fifties, sixties or seventies would not work. For example, the information aggregation, and in particular the rule to follow the majority emerge. If we had specified a priori that the individual agents follow the majority rule then we would have stayed at a performance level of 0.50. Also, when the majority rule emerges as a good rule, this does not imply that everybody should follow it. If they did, then the performance would fall back again to 0.50. Hence, what matters is also the precise configuration of rules used in the population. And the continuously changing configurations that emerged turned out to lead to both a high performance level, and information contagion with pathdependent lock-in.
In all excitement about the computer output in ACE research, methodological issues are sometimes a little bit neglected. Nevertheless, they are quite important. Not because ACE presents innovative methodological insights, but because it turns out to be a very advantageous way to actually apply the 20 Littlechild [1986] even asserts that Austrian models in general have not been represented mathematically.
abstract methodological insights of Hayek and others. Moreover, acknowledging this, in turn, helps to put ACE research in the right perspective, facilitating a fruitful interpretation of its output as well.
Social theory is the explanation of social phenomena, where explanation is the brain's modeling of the complex events to be explained. As Weimer [1982] puts it: "explanation is modeling" (p. 271).
According to Hayek [1948d] kind of phenomenon rather than to a particular event" (Hayek [1967a] , p. 15).
Hence, Hayek advocates not only an 'as if' argument, but he also argues that we can hope to explain at best general principles, or stylized facts. Although he did not discuss ACE models as such, Hayek [1982] seems to use the same argument concerning the degree of explanation that we can achieve also with respect to ACE models of complex social phenomena. (Hayek [1982] . p. 292/293; emphasis added).
Perhaps it is useful to stress that Hayek is here arguing in favor of building a "really true model" of a rat (or ACE models, for that matter). The skeptical part of his remarks is related to the fact that he explicitly uses this illustration to justify his contention concerning the "absolute limit to our powers of explanation" (p. 292). In exactly the same way, ACE models are abstractions from reality, and not aimed at replicating reality. Hence the term 'simulation' to describe ACE models might create confusion, since ACE models do not try to simulate reality as such, but only to understand some general phenomena, the stylized facts. be a numerical analysis. The great advantage of ACE models, then, is that one can do much more extensive and elaborate consistency checks. In some sense, ACE allows us to do experiments now also in the social sciences. But notice that Hayek's distinction between the natural sciences and the social sciences remains still valid, because the experiments made possible by ACE concern the level of the model, and not reality itself.
To conclude, it would probably be presumptuous to judge whether Hayek might have been an ACE, but in any case it seems clear that ACE is social theory in a Hayekian tradition. And therefore a further exchange of insights would seem fruitful.
